Files
deer-flow/backend/tests/test_sandbox_tools_security.py

112 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
Raw Normal View History

feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths (#983) * feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths - enforce local sandbox file tools to only accept /mnt/user-data paths - add path traversal checks against thread workspace/uploads/outputs roots - preserve requested virtual paths in tool error messages (no host path leaks) - mask local absolute paths in bash output back to virtual sandbox paths - update bash tool guidance to prefer thread-local venv + python -m pip - add regression tests for path mapping, masking, and access restrictions Fixes #968 * feat(sandbox): restrict risky absolute paths in local bash commands - validate absolute path usage in local-mode bash commands - allow only /mnt/user-data virtual paths for user data access - keep a small allowlist for system executable/device paths - return clear permission errors for unsafe command paths - add regression tests for bash path validation rules * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path (#992) * Initial plan * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path (#991) * Initial plan * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-13 22:38:32 +08:00
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
refactor: split backend into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) (#1131) * refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-14 22:55:52 +08:00
from deerflow.sandbox.tools import (
feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths (#983) * feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths - enforce local sandbox file tools to only accept /mnt/user-data paths - add path traversal checks against thread workspace/uploads/outputs roots - preserve requested virtual paths in tool error messages (no host path leaks) - mask local absolute paths in bash output back to virtual sandbox paths - update bash tool guidance to prefer thread-local venv + python -m pip - add regression tests for path mapping, masking, and access restrictions Fixes #968 * feat(sandbox): restrict risky absolute paths in local bash commands - validate absolute path usage in local-mode bash commands - allow only /mnt/user-data virtual paths for user data access - keep a small allowlist for system executable/device paths - return clear permission errors for unsafe command paths - add regression tests for bash path validation rules * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path (#992) * Initial plan * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path (#991) * Initial plan * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-13 22:38:32 +08:00
VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX,
mask_local_paths_in_output,
replace_virtual_path,
resolve_local_tool_path,
validate_local_bash_command_paths,
)
def test_replace_virtual_path_maps_virtual_root_and_subpaths() -> None:
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
assert Path(replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/a.txt", thread_data)).as_posix() == "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/a.txt"
assert Path(replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data", thread_data)).as_posix() == "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data"
feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths (#983) * feat(sandbox): harden local file access and mask host paths - enforce local sandbox file tools to only accept /mnt/user-data paths - add path traversal checks against thread workspace/uploads/outputs roots - preserve requested virtual paths in tool error messages (no host path leaks) - mask local absolute paths in bash output back to virtual sandbox paths - update bash tool guidance to prefer thread-local venv + python -m pip - add regression tests for path mapping, masking, and access restrictions Fixes #968 * feat(sandbox): restrict risky absolute paths in local bash commands - validate absolute path usage in local-mode bash commands - allow only /mnt/user-data virtual paths for user data access - keep a small allowlist for system executable/device paths - return clear permission errors for unsafe command paths - add regression tests for bash path validation rules * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path (#992) * Initial plan * test(sandbox): add success path test for resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path (#991) * Initial plan * fix(sandbox): reject bare virtual root early with clear error in resolve_local_tool_path Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-13 22:38:32 +08:00
def test_mask_local_paths_in_output_hides_host_paths() -> None:
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
output = "Created: /tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/result.txt"
masked = mask_local_paths_in_output(output, thread_data)
assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data" not in masked
assert "/mnt/user-data/workspace/result.txt" in masked
def test_resolve_local_tool_path_rejects_non_virtual_path() -> None:
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Only paths under"):
resolve_local_tool_path("/Users/someone/config.yaml", thread_data)
def test_resolve_local_tool_path_rejects_virtual_root_with_clear_message() -> None:
"""Passing the bare virtual root /mnt/user-data should be rejected early with a
clear 'Only paths under' message, not the misleading 'path traversal detected'
error that would result from the root mapping to a common parent directory."""
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Only paths under"):
resolve_local_tool_path(VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, thread_data)
def test_resolve_local_tool_path_returns_host_path_for_valid_virtual_path() -> None:
base = Path("/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data")
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": str(base / "workspace"),
"uploads_path": str(base / "uploads"),
"outputs_path": str(base / "outputs"),
}
result = resolve_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/file.txt", thread_data)
expected = str((base / "workspace" / "file.txt").resolve())
assert result == expected
def test_resolve_local_tool_path_rejects_path_traversal() -> None:
base = Path("/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data")
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": str(base / "workspace"),
"uploads_path": str(base / "uploads"),
"outputs_path": str(base / "outputs"),
}
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
resolve_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/../../../../etc/passwd", thread_data)
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_host_paths() -> None:
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Unsafe absolute paths"):
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /etc/passwd", thread_data)
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_virtual_and_system_paths() -> None:
thread_data = {
"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
}
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
"/bin/echo ok > /mnt/user-data/workspace/out.txt && cat /dev/null",
thread_data,
)