Files
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/uploads/manager.py
DanielWalnut d119214fee feat(harness): integration ACP agent tool (#1344)
* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports

Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and
CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py.
This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer)
into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*)

Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers:

- **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework
  package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools,
  models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure.

- **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`.
  Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations).

Key changes:
- Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv
- Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv
- Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer)
- Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member
- Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files
- Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml
- Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution
- Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting
- Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure

Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app.
All 429 tests pass. Lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs

Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in
packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or
`import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural
rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer.

Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture,
import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup

When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml
files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and
auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.*
renames) are applied automatically before services start.

- Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml
- Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file()
- Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements
- Add `make config-upgrade` target
- Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services
- Add config error hints in service failure messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix comments

* fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.*

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml

Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131:
- Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files
- Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only
  looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion

- loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3)
  after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/
  so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/
- app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in
  _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value
  as string (e.g. config_version: "1")
- tests: add regression tests for both fixes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation (#37)

* feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation

* build(harness): make ACP dependency required

* fix(harness): address ACP review feedback

* feat(harness): decouple ACP agent workspace from thread data

ACP agents (codex, claude-code) previously used per-thread workspace
directories, causing path resolution complexity and coupling task
execution to DeerFlow's internal thread data layout. This change:

- Replace _resolve_cwd() with a fixed _get_work_dir() that always uses
  {base_dir}/acp-workspace/, eliminating virtual path translation and
  thread_id lookups
- Introduce /mnt/acp-workspace virtual path for lead agent read-only
  access to ACP agent output files (same pattern as /mnt/skills)
- Add security guards: read-only validation, path traversal prevention,
  command path allowlisting, and output masking for acp-workspace
- Update system prompt and tool description to guide LLM: send
  self-contained tasks to ACP agents, copy results via /mnt/acp-workspace
- Add 11 new security tests for ACP workspace path handling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(prompt): inject ACP section only when ACP agents are configured

The ACP agent guidance in the system prompt is now conditionally built
by _build_acp_section(), which checks get_acp_agents() and returns an
empty string when no ACP agents are configured. This avoids polluting
the prompt with irrelevant instructions for users who don't use ACP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix lint

* fix(harness): address Copilot review comments on sandbox path handling and ACP tool

- local_sandbox: fix path-segment boundary bug in _resolve_path (== or startswith +"/")
  and add lookahead in _resolve_paths_in_command regex to prevent /mnt/skills matching
  inside /mnt/skills-extra
- local_sandbox_provider: replace print() with logger.warning(..., exc_info=True)
- invoke_acp_agent_tool: guard getattr(option, "optionId") with None default + continue;
  move full prompt from INFO to DEBUG level (truncated to 200 chars)
- sandbox/tools: fix _get_acp_workspace_host_path docstring to match implementation;
  remove misleading "read-only" language from validate_local_bash_command_paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): thread-isolated workspaces, permission guardrail, and ContextVar registry

P1.1 – ACP workspace thread isolation
- Add `Paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)` for per-thread paths
- `_get_work_dir(thread_id)` in invoke_acp_agent_tool now uses
  `{base_dir}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`; falls back to
  global workspace when thread_id is absent or invalid
- `_invoke` extracts thread_id from `RunnableConfig` via
  `Annotated[RunnableConfig, InjectedToolArg]`
- `sandbox/tools.py`: `_get_acp_workspace_host_path(thread_id)`,
  `_resolve_acp_workspace_path(path, thread_id)`, and all callers
  (`replace_virtual_paths_in_command`, `mask_local_paths_in_output`,
  `ls_tool`, `read_file_tool`) now resolve ACP paths per-thread

P1.2 – ACP permission guardrail
- New `auto_approve_permissions: bool = False` field in `ACPAgentConfig`
- `_build_permission_response(options, *, auto_approve: bool)` now
  defaults to deny; only approves when `auto_approve=True`
- Document field in `config.example.yaml`

P2 – Deferred tool registry race condition
- Replace module-level `_registry` global with `contextvars.ContextVar`
- Each asyncio request context gets its own registry; worker threads
  inherit the context automatically via `loop.run_in_executor`
- Expose `get_deferred_registry` / `set_deferred_registry` /
  `reset_deferred_registry` helpers

Tests: 831 pass (57 for affected modules, 3 new tests)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandbox): mount /mnt/acp-workspace in docker sandbox container

The AioSandboxProvider was not mounting the ACP workspace into the
sandbox container, so /mnt/acp-workspace was inaccessible when the lead
agent tried to read ACP results in docker mode.

Changes:
- `ensure_thread_dirs`: also create `acp-workspace/` (chmod 0o777) so
  the directory exists before the sandbox container starts — required
  for Docker volume mounts
- `_get_thread_mounts`: add read-only `/mnt/acp-workspace` mount using
  the per-thread host path (`host_paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)`)
- Update stale CLAUDE.md description (was "fixed global workspace")

Tests: `test_aio_sandbox_provider.py` (4 new tests)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lint): remove unused imports in test_aio_sandbox_provider

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix config

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 14:20:18 +08:00

202 lines
6.5 KiB
Python

"""Shared upload management logic.
Pure business logic — no FastAPI/HTTP dependencies.
Both Gateway and Client delegate to these functions.
"""
import os
import re
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import quote
from deerflow.config.paths import VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, get_paths
class PathTraversalError(ValueError):
"""Raised when a path escapes its allowed base directory."""
# thread_id must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, or dots only.
_SAFE_THREAD_ID = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$")
def validate_thread_id(thread_id: str) -> None:
"""Reject thread IDs containing characters unsafe for filesystem paths.
Raises:
ValueError: If thread_id is empty or contains unsafe characters.
"""
if not thread_id or not _SAFE_THREAD_ID.match(thread_id):
raise ValueError(f"Invalid thread_id: {thread_id!r}")
def get_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
"""Return the uploads directory path for a thread (no side effects)."""
validate_thread_id(thread_id)
return get_paths().sandbox_uploads_dir(thread_id)
def ensure_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
"""Return the uploads directory for a thread, creating it if needed."""
base = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return base
def normalize_filename(filename: str) -> str:
"""Sanitize a filename by extracting its basename.
Strips any directory components and rejects traversal patterns.
Args:
filename: Raw filename from user input (may contain path components).
Returns:
Safe filename (basename only).
Raises:
ValueError: If filename is empty or resolves to a traversal pattern.
"""
if not filename:
raise ValueError("Filename is empty")
safe = Path(filename).name
if not safe or safe in {".", ".."}:
raise ValueError(f"Filename is unsafe: {filename!r}")
# Reject backslashes — on Linux Path.name keeps them as literal chars,
# but they indicate a Windows-style path that should be stripped or rejected.
if "\\" in safe:
raise ValueError(f"Filename contains backslash: {filename!r}")
if len(safe.encode("utf-8")) > 255:
raise ValueError(f"Filename too long: {len(safe)} chars")
return safe
def claim_unique_filename(name: str, seen: set[str]) -> str:
"""Generate a unique filename by appending ``_N`` suffix on collision.
Automatically adds the returned name to *seen* so callers don't need to.
Args:
name: Candidate filename.
seen: Set of filenames already claimed (mutated in place).
Returns:
A filename not present in *seen* (already added to *seen*).
"""
if name not in seen:
seen.add(name)
return name
stem, suffix = Path(name).stem, Path(name).suffix
counter = 1
candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
while candidate in seen:
counter += 1
candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
seen.add(candidate)
return candidate
def validate_path_traversal(path: Path, base: Path) -> None:
"""Verify that *path* is inside *base*.
Raises:
PathTraversalError: If a path traversal is detected.
"""
try:
path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
except ValueError:
raise PathTraversalError("Path traversal detected") from None
def list_files_in_dir(directory: Path) -> dict:
"""List files (not directories) in *directory*.
Args:
directory: Directory to scan.
Returns:
Dict with "files" list (sorted by name) and "count".
Each file entry has ``size`` as *int* (bytes). Call
:func:`enrich_file_listing` to stringify sizes and add
virtual / artifact URLs.
"""
if not directory.is_dir():
return {"files": [], "count": 0}
files = []
with os.scandir(directory) as entries:
for entry in sorted(entries, key=lambda e: e.name):
if not entry.is_file(follow_symlinks=False):
continue
st = entry.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
files.append(
{
"filename": entry.name,
"size": st.st_size,
"path": entry.path,
"extension": Path(entry.name).suffix,
"modified": st.st_mtime,
}
)
return {"files": files, "count": len(files)}
def delete_file_safe(base_dir: Path, filename: str, *, convertible_extensions: set[str] | None = None) -> dict:
"""Delete a file inside *base_dir* after path-traversal validation.
If *convertible_extensions* is provided and the file's extension matches,
the companion ``.md`` file is also removed (if it exists).
Args:
base_dir: Directory containing the file.
filename: Name of file to delete.
convertible_extensions: Lowercase extensions (e.g. ``{".pdf", ".docx"}``)
whose companion markdown should be cleaned up.
Returns:
Dict with success and message.
Raises:
FileNotFoundError: If the file does not exist.
PathTraversalError: If path traversal is detected.
"""
file_path = (base_dir / filename).resolve()
validate_path_traversal(file_path, base_dir)
if not file_path.is_file():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {filename}")
file_path.unlink()
# Clean up companion markdown generated during upload conversion.
if convertible_extensions and file_path.suffix.lower() in convertible_extensions:
file_path.with_suffix(".md").unlink(missing_ok=True)
return {"success": True, "message": f"Deleted {filename}"}
def upload_artifact_url(thread_id: str, filename: str) -> str:
"""Build the artifact URL for a file in a thread's uploads directory.
*filename* is percent-encoded so that spaces, ``#``, ``?`` etc. are safe.
"""
return f"/api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{quote(filename, safe='')}"
def upload_virtual_path(filename: str) -> str:
"""Build the virtual path for a file in the uploads directory."""
return f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{filename}"
def enrich_file_listing(result: dict, thread_id: str) -> dict:
"""Add virtual paths, artifact URLs, and stringify sizes on a listing result.
Mutates *result* in place and returns it for convenience.
"""
for f in result["files"]:
filename = f["filename"]
f["size"] = str(f["size"])
f["virtual_path"] = upload_virtual_path(filename)
f["artifact_url"] = upload_artifact_url(thread_id, filename)
return result