mirror of
https://gitee.com/wanwujie/deer-flow
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* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation (#37) * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation * build(harness): make ACP dependency required * fix(harness): address ACP review feedback * feat(harness): decouple ACP agent workspace from thread data ACP agents (codex, claude-code) previously used per-thread workspace directories, causing path resolution complexity and coupling task execution to DeerFlow's internal thread data layout. This change: - Replace _resolve_cwd() with a fixed _get_work_dir() that always uses {base_dir}/acp-workspace/, eliminating virtual path translation and thread_id lookups - Introduce /mnt/acp-workspace virtual path for lead agent read-only access to ACP agent output files (same pattern as /mnt/skills) - Add security guards: read-only validation, path traversal prevention, command path allowlisting, and output masking for acp-workspace - Update system prompt and tool description to guide LLM: send self-contained tasks to ACP agents, copy results via /mnt/acp-workspace - Add 11 new security tests for ACP workspace path handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(prompt): inject ACP section only when ACP agents are configured The ACP agent guidance in the system prompt is now conditionally built by _build_acp_section(), which checks get_acp_agents() and returns an empty string when no ACP agents are configured. This avoids polluting the prompt with irrelevant instructions for users who don't use ACP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix lint * fix(harness): address Copilot review comments on sandbox path handling and ACP tool - local_sandbox: fix path-segment boundary bug in _resolve_path (== or startswith +"/") and add lookahead in _resolve_paths_in_command regex to prevent /mnt/skills matching inside /mnt/skills-extra - local_sandbox_provider: replace print() with logger.warning(..., exc_info=True) - invoke_acp_agent_tool: guard getattr(option, "optionId") with None default + continue; move full prompt from INFO to DEBUG level (truncated to 200 chars) - sandbox/tools: fix _get_acp_workspace_host_path docstring to match implementation; remove misleading "read-only" language from validate_local_bash_command_paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(acp): thread-isolated workspaces, permission guardrail, and ContextVar registry P1.1 – ACP workspace thread isolation - Add `Paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)` for per-thread paths - `_get_work_dir(thread_id)` in invoke_acp_agent_tool now uses `{base_dir}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`; falls back to global workspace when thread_id is absent or invalid - `_invoke` extracts thread_id from `RunnableConfig` via `Annotated[RunnableConfig, InjectedToolArg]` - `sandbox/tools.py`: `_get_acp_workspace_host_path(thread_id)`, `_resolve_acp_workspace_path(path, thread_id)`, and all callers (`replace_virtual_paths_in_command`, `mask_local_paths_in_output`, `ls_tool`, `read_file_tool`) now resolve ACP paths per-thread P1.2 – ACP permission guardrail - New `auto_approve_permissions: bool = False` field in `ACPAgentConfig` - `_build_permission_response(options, *, auto_approve: bool)` now defaults to deny; only approves when `auto_approve=True` - Document field in `config.example.yaml` P2 – Deferred tool registry race condition - Replace module-level `_registry` global with `contextvars.ContextVar` - Each asyncio request context gets its own registry; worker threads inherit the context automatically via `loop.run_in_executor` - Expose `get_deferred_registry` / `set_deferred_registry` / `reset_deferred_registry` helpers Tests: 831 pass (57 for affected modules, 3 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): mount /mnt/acp-workspace in docker sandbox container The AioSandboxProvider was not mounting the ACP workspace into the sandbox container, so /mnt/acp-workspace was inaccessible when the lead agent tried to read ACP results in docker mode. Changes: - `ensure_thread_dirs`: also create `acp-workspace/` (chmod 0o777) so the directory exists before the sandbox container starts — required for Docker volume mounts - `_get_thread_mounts`: add read-only `/mnt/acp-workspace` mount using the per-thread host path (`host_paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)`) - Update stale CLAUDE.md description (was "fixed global workspace") Tests: `test_aio_sandbox_provider.py` (4 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): remove unused imports in test_aio_sandbox_provider Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix config --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
202 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
202 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
"""Shared upload management logic.
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Pure business logic — no FastAPI/HTTP dependencies.
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Both Gateway and Client delegate to these functions.
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"""
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import os
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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from urllib.parse import quote
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from deerflow.config.paths import VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, get_paths
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class PathTraversalError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a path escapes its allowed base directory."""
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# thread_id must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, or dots only.
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_SAFE_THREAD_ID = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$")
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def validate_thread_id(thread_id: str) -> None:
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"""Reject thread IDs containing characters unsafe for filesystem paths.
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Raises:
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ValueError: If thread_id is empty or contains unsafe characters.
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"""
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if not thread_id or not _SAFE_THREAD_ID.match(thread_id):
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raise ValueError(f"Invalid thread_id: {thread_id!r}")
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def get_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
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"""Return the uploads directory path for a thread (no side effects)."""
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validate_thread_id(thread_id)
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return get_paths().sandbox_uploads_dir(thread_id)
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def ensure_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
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"""Return the uploads directory for a thread, creating it if needed."""
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base = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
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base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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return base
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def normalize_filename(filename: str) -> str:
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"""Sanitize a filename by extracting its basename.
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Strips any directory components and rejects traversal patterns.
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Args:
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filename: Raw filename from user input (may contain path components).
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Returns:
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Safe filename (basename only).
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Raises:
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ValueError: If filename is empty or resolves to a traversal pattern.
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"""
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if not filename:
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raise ValueError("Filename is empty")
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safe = Path(filename).name
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if not safe or safe in {".", ".."}:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename is unsafe: {filename!r}")
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# Reject backslashes — on Linux Path.name keeps them as literal chars,
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# but they indicate a Windows-style path that should be stripped or rejected.
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if "\\" in safe:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename contains backslash: {filename!r}")
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if len(safe.encode("utf-8")) > 255:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename too long: {len(safe)} chars")
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return safe
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def claim_unique_filename(name: str, seen: set[str]) -> str:
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"""Generate a unique filename by appending ``_N`` suffix on collision.
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Automatically adds the returned name to *seen* so callers don't need to.
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Args:
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name: Candidate filename.
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seen: Set of filenames already claimed (mutated in place).
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Returns:
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A filename not present in *seen* (already added to *seen*).
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"""
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if name not in seen:
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seen.add(name)
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return name
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stem, suffix = Path(name).stem, Path(name).suffix
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counter = 1
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candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
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while candidate in seen:
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counter += 1
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candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
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seen.add(candidate)
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return candidate
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def validate_path_traversal(path: Path, base: Path) -> None:
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"""Verify that *path* is inside *base*.
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Raises:
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PathTraversalError: If a path traversal is detected.
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"""
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try:
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path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
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except ValueError:
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raise PathTraversalError("Path traversal detected") from None
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def list_files_in_dir(directory: Path) -> dict:
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"""List files (not directories) in *directory*.
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Args:
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directory: Directory to scan.
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Returns:
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Dict with "files" list (sorted by name) and "count".
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Each file entry has ``size`` as *int* (bytes). Call
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:func:`enrich_file_listing` to stringify sizes and add
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virtual / artifact URLs.
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"""
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if not directory.is_dir():
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return {"files": [], "count": 0}
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files = []
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with os.scandir(directory) as entries:
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for entry in sorted(entries, key=lambda e: e.name):
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if not entry.is_file(follow_symlinks=False):
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continue
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st = entry.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
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files.append(
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{
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"filename": entry.name,
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"size": st.st_size,
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"path": entry.path,
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"extension": Path(entry.name).suffix,
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"modified": st.st_mtime,
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}
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)
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return {"files": files, "count": len(files)}
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def delete_file_safe(base_dir: Path, filename: str, *, convertible_extensions: set[str] | None = None) -> dict:
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"""Delete a file inside *base_dir* after path-traversal validation.
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If *convertible_extensions* is provided and the file's extension matches,
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the companion ``.md`` file is also removed (if it exists).
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Args:
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base_dir: Directory containing the file.
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filename: Name of file to delete.
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convertible_extensions: Lowercase extensions (e.g. ``{".pdf", ".docx"}``)
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whose companion markdown should be cleaned up.
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Returns:
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Dict with success and message.
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Raises:
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FileNotFoundError: If the file does not exist.
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PathTraversalError: If path traversal is detected.
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"""
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file_path = (base_dir / filename).resolve()
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validate_path_traversal(file_path, base_dir)
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if not file_path.is_file():
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raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {filename}")
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file_path.unlink()
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# Clean up companion markdown generated during upload conversion.
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if convertible_extensions and file_path.suffix.lower() in convertible_extensions:
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file_path.with_suffix(".md").unlink(missing_ok=True)
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return {"success": True, "message": f"Deleted {filename}"}
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def upload_artifact_url(thread_id: str, filename: str) -> str:
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"""Build the artifact URL for a file in a thread's uploads directory.
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*filename* is percent-encoded so that spaces, ``#``, ``?`` etc. are safe.
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"""
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return f"/api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{quote(filename, safe='')}"
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def upload_virtual_path(filename: str) -> str:
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"""Build the virtual path for a file in the uploads directory."""
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return f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{filename}"
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def enrich_file_listing(result: dict, thread_id: str) -> dict:
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"""Add virtual paths, artifact URLs, and stringify sizes on a listing result.
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Mutates *result* in place and returns it for convenience.
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"""
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for f in result["files"]:
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filename = f["filename"]
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f["size"] = str(f["size"])
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f["virtual_path"] = upload_virtual_path(filename)
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f["artifact_url"] = upload_artifact_url(thread_id, filename)
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return result
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